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1. Be efficient (it’s the primary goal)
2. Be sovereign (keep control of choices and citizens’ data)
3. Be privacy friendly (it’s a high responsibility, tool is sensitive)
4. Be flexible (which country you want to deploy the app does matter a lot… there’s 
n o single answer)
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Outline
• ROBERT and StopCovid
• What about GAEN? Would it be an option?
• DESIRE, a 3rd way for a European exposure notification system
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ROBERT and StopCovid
• early April, decision to propose a “centralized” approach for France
o risk analysis carried in a central server that necessarily keeps some information (e.g., 
pseudonyms of users potentially at risk)
o under the control of the Health Authority (data controller)
o audited by our Data Protection Agency (CNIL)
• still convinced it is the best option for France
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#1 Efficiency considerations
• being centralized is a plus from an epidemiological viewpoint
o real-time knowledge of epidemic spread
o monitoring of the number of warnings sent
o full control on warning criteria (e.g., to adjust to PCR testing capacity)
Can be critical in crisis time!
• StopCovid official statistics not yet available (expected soon)
o … but the situation changed quite a bit since June
o end of August: in spite of low app usage, currently approx. 100 uploads/day (user 
tested COVID+ who volunteer to share data) and 10 notifications/day
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#2 Sovereignty considerations
• sovereignty is the only reasonable approach 
o keep control of citizen’s health data
o “Alphabet’s Verily Plans to Use Big Data for Health Insurance”, Bloomberg, 2020/08/25
o Q: what’s the price to pay for the free GAEN system?
o keep control of technology
o choose what is the best option, freely
o minimize dependence on G&A (e.g., with Orange new sovereign captcha service in place of 
Google re-captcha, as asked by CNIL)
• … despite difficulties (it requires more work, from all viewpoints)
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#3 Privacy considerations
• user privacy is not an option, data is sensitive… High responsibility
• lesson learned: ask your DPA as soon as possible!
o we did it for ROBERT specifications (in April)
o Deliberation N°. 2020-046 of April 24, 2020 delivering an opinion on a proposed mobile application called "StopCovid"
o for app development work (in May)
o Deliberation N° 2020-056 from 25 May 2020 delivering an opinion on a draft decree relating to the mobile application known as StopCovid
o for StopCovid deployment (audit in June… App v1.1 validated in Sept. 3rd)
o Décision n°2020-015 du 3 septembre 2020 - Clôture de la décision n°2020-015 du 15/07/2020 mettant en demeure le ministère des 
Solidarités et de la Santé
o periodic audits will continue to take place
CNIL says current StopCovid is GDPR compliant J
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Outline
• ROBERT and StopCovid
• What about GAEN? Would it be an option?
• DESIRE, a 3rd way for a European exposure notification system
9
No, GAEN has major privacy issues
• Google/Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN), being decentralized, creates IOHO 
unacceptable discrimination risks
reason: ”making public a pseudonymized 
database containing health data is risky”
thermore, the corresponding certificate is issued byQuoVadis Limited to Bundesamt
für Informatik und Telekommunikation BIT.
Indexing The SwissCovid system does not use an index file. Rather, it relies on
the current date to identify the relevant KeyFiles that are identified by a timestamp.
At the time of our study, the first batch would correspond to June 20 (1592611200)
which is not yet 14 days apart from the current date.
KeyFiles The KeyFiles are named after a UNIX timestamp and are located at URLs
following the format https://www.pt.bfs.admin.ch/v1/gaen/exposed/<id>. Here,
<id> is the timestamp padded with zeros.


























this entry is for a COVID+ 
GAEN user
(NB: we redacted TEK data)
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Why is GAEN risky?
legitimate GAEN user
National “diagnosed keys” server
(contains all uploaded {TEKs}) 
attacker
download possible 
since there’s no 
access control(*)
Alice, who is tested COVID+, 
accepts to upload her TEKs
{TEKs}




Why is GAEN risky? (2)
• Summary: database contains pseudonyms (since TEKs enable to compute the 
associated daily pseudonyms, the RPIs) attached to health data (i.e., persons 
tested COVID+)
è Key question: can an attacker re-identify Alice?
• No if the attacker only collects TEKs from the national server, and nothing else






It’s different if the attacker did BLE scans 
• The attacker anticipated and started collecting RPIs in an area of interest... 
• … then he immediately knows if someone associated to the RPIs collected has uploaded 
her TEKs after being tested COVID+
hides a BLE scanner è





from TEKs, computes 













Many variants possible depending on…
• … the attacker’s area of interest
o a building, a shop, a company, an administration
• … his motivations
o compute statistics (how many COVID+ persons living in my building | in my shop | at my 
competitor…)
o re-identify people
• … his capabilities
o deploy a camera along with the BLE scanner (an employer want’s to know) to easily re-
identify infected users
o use a fidelity card information
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Is it difficult? No
• very cheap devices
o old smartphones, dedicated devices (10 Euros or so)
• very easy to hide
o anywhere (e.g., in a mailbox)
• very easy to setup
o plug and play softwares (free BLE scanners available)
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BLE scanners already exist for GAEN
• https://github.com/oseiskar/corona-sniffer (Android sniffer app now available)
• for additional information and “paparazzi attack”
“The Dark Side of SwissCovid”, Prof. S. Vaudenay, https://lasec.epfl.ch/people/vaudenay/swisscovid.html
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A known problem, without known solution
• “Replay Attacks”, June 14th, 2020
“Unmasking users by eavesdropping EphIDs
[…] It is important to keep the app running whenever infection situations with unknown people can 
occur, but it is better to turn it off at home, which reduces the replay attack risk on the receiving side, 
when in places that should later not be exposed, or when at work if a risk of BLE collectors operated by 
the employer exists.”  
• “Security Report Proximity Scanning”, May 28th, 2020 
o Feasibility of the “secret sharing” mitigation is uncertain [VR: it has been removed from 
DP-3T May 25th spec.] and anyway depends on Google / Apple willingness
• “Best Practices: Operational Security for Proximity Tracing”, June 2020, DP-3T  
o DP-3T authors suggest the privacy leak is of lower importance because it’s difficult given 
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Would GAEN be applicable to France? Probably not
• reason 1: IOHO we think our Data Protection Agency would not 
validate GAEN as GDPR compliant
o NB: this is only an opinion
o threats are practical and concern sensitive data
• reason 2: users must be aware of discrimination risks while 
agreeing to upload their “diagnosed keys” for a valid, informed 
consent
o this obligation will probably discourage most users
C   NSENT
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Outline
• ROBERT and StopCovid
• What about GAEN? Would it be an option?
• DESIRE, a 3rd way for a European exposure notification system
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DESIRE: share private encounter pseudonyms
• pseudonyms are called ”Private Encounter Tokens” (PET):
• change across time and devices
• are private to users who meet, eavesdroppers cannot recompute them
• based on well-known Diffie-Hellman crypto 
(NB: for privacy reasons, we derive two different PETs per encounter, on for status query, the other one in 
case of COVID+ diagnosis)
paradigm shift: from **public device** pseudonyms to 
**private encounter** pseudonyms
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(*) pseudonyms are private, change 
over time (every 15 min) and device 
Eve
(listening to BLE traffic)




DESIRE can be (cen/decen/*)tralized
• (D1-design) centralized risk evaluation
• (intermediate D2-design)
• (D3-design) decentralized risk eval. (1) encounter
(3) {diagnosed PETs}
risk evaluation
























#4 Flexibility criteria: choose what deployment you 
want, freely
• each country chooses what to do, in a sovereign manner
o citizens don’t trust their institutions and are not afraid of discrimination risks (limited with 
DESIRE)? è decentralized
o citizens trust their DPA and institutions? è centralized
• all DESIRE deployments fully interoperate, seamlessly
• Matches Criteria #4: flexibility J
o it’s not the case of ROBERT or GAEN
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Beyond paper work: our Proof-of-Concept





o supports centralized and dec. modes
Smartphone side (Kotlin Android app)
• BLE
o done: tested 3 options, carousel mode is 
fine for maximum compatibility
o no consumption/acquisition time issue 
found
• Asymmetric crypto computations
o done: no latency/power issue found
• Protocol
o done
o supports centralized and dec. modes
• TODO: assess traffic load, probably the 




Conclusions and lessons learned
• no perfect security and privacy
o special situations (e.g., US votes) may require to suspend the service for some time
• yet digital tracing may be effective
o proposing something was the only valid option
• very proud of ROBERT/StopCovid
o being centralized and sovereign were key decisions for FR
o asking our DPA (CNIL) opinion immediately was key
o CNIL said current StopCovid is GDPR compliant J
o StopCovid app works fine and helps…
o …even if it was not easy and if it could work better with Apple help
o raises many side questions (e.g., OS and big tech companies neutrality)
o Shoshana Zuboff (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NOKxAIyPLpo -- offset: 30:46 - 35:38)
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Conclusions and lessons learned (2)
• DESIRE goes beyond, by adding flexibility to the other 3 criteria
o choosing between (cen/decen)tralized depends on the target country
o with trusted institutions, being centralized is IOHO preferable
(current GAEN to avoid because of discrimination risks and IOHO hazardous GDPR compliance)
o in authoritarian countries, being decentralized is preferable
o leave each country the sovereign choice of the model, while guaranteeing full 
interoperability between them J
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Thank you!
• “Asterix and Obelix and the Covix Tracing App”, C. Castellix, 
Inria Privatix, Eurocrypt 2020 panel on “contact tracing”
• ROBERT docs.: https://github.com/ROBERT-proximity-tracing/documents
• DESIRE docs.: https://github.com/3rd-ways-for-EU-exposure-notification/project-DESIRE
• StopCovid source code: https://gitlab.inria.fr/stopcovid19
thirdways@inria.fr
Important Disclaimer: This is a pure fiction! Any resemblance to 




Can ROBERT solve GAEN privacy issues (slide #9)?
• BLE scanners exist (e.g., Stop Covid Detector 3000) but it is essentially used to 
check if StopCovid app is working fine
• no link to user health data possible! 
StopCovid being centralized,
information is not available to
the public J
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Can DESIRE solve GAEN privacy issues (slide #9)?
• A “centralized” deployment of DESIRE is immune by design
• A “decentralized” deployment of DESIRE prevents passive BLE scans by design 
o identifying encounters rather than endpoints helps: requires an active BLE component, 
o attack is more difficult and more easily identifiable
o attacker must remain close to Alice approx. 50 sec to compute the PET, limits risks 
o de facto “secret-sharing” feature… see DESIRE PoC
